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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SHANNON TY MELVIN,

/

Petitioner/Appellee,

/

vs.

/

STEPHEN T. BAKER, Jr,

/

Respondent/Appellant

Appeal No. 20060643-CA

/

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction lies in this court pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1953 as
amended.)
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether Judge Skanchy's award of a judgment to Mrs. Melvin in

the amount of $27,124.85 for overdue daycare costs and medical expenses was
supported by the evidence;
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

A trial court's findings of fact are

reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923, 929
(UtahApp. 1998).
2,

Whether it was plain error for Judge Skanchy not to recuse himself

after Melvin wrote a letter to Governor Huntsman alleging the judge was
incompetent?

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

To establish plain error, a party must show

that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii)
the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable outcome for the appellant." Berkshires, L.L.C. v. Sykes, 2005 UT App. 536, f
21,127P.3dl243.
3.

Whether the trial court committed plain error in granting Melvin

judgment rather than concluding that Melvin5 s claims were barred because they
had not been raised prior to the December 2005 Order to Show Cause.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The same standard of review exists for

this issue as for the second.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Disposition of this appeal is governed U.C.A. §§ 78-45-7.15 and 78-457.16, both of which were attached as Addendum C to Appellant's brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties herein were divorced on December 21, 1994. R. 41. As a
component of the Decree, each party was ordered to pay one-half of the children's
portion of the health insurance premium, one-half of non-covered medical and
dental expenses, and one-half of daycare expenses. R. 49.
On November 4, 1997, Mrs. Melvin filed an order to show cause seeking
judgment for past daycare and medical expenses. R. 135-37. On December 26,
1997, the Third District Court ordered:

2

a.

Mr. Baker was to pay one-half of all uncovered medical and dental
expenses and work-related daycare expenses;

b.

Mrs. Melvin was to provide evidence of the expenses she had
incurred prior to that date;

c.

Mr. Baker was to make payments in the amount of $100.00 towards
the arrearage; and

d.

Mr. Baker was to pay his share of ongoing daycare (at that time
$273.00 per month) on or before the 10 of each month. R. 151.

On September 15, 2004, the State of Utah intervened and filed a Petition to
Modify Mr. Baker's child support obligation. R. 194. This Petition to Modify
was set for trial on December 1, 2005, and the parties appeared on that date and
advised the court that a settlement had been reached as to child support. R. 439.
Between 1997 and 2005, the parties had had many disputes regarding
visitation, which resulted in a finding on March 17, 2005, that Mrs. Melvin should
be held in contempt of court. R. 389. On April 19, 2005, Mrs. Melvin wrote a
letter to Governor Huntsman complaining that Judge Skanchy was incompetent.
R. 405.
In December of 2005, Mrs. Melvin filed a new order to show cause seeking
judgment for unpaid medical and daycare arrearages. R. 441. On April 11, 2006,
the Court held an evidentiary hearing regarding Mrs. Melvin's allegations. R. 785.
The Court concluded that Mr. Baker was in arrears and entered judgment in favor
of Mrs. Melvin in the amount of $27,124.85. R. 731. This appeal ensued.
3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A.

THE JUDGMENT IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

Mr. Baker's challenge of Judge Skanchy's factual findings is facially deficient
because he failed to marshal the evidence. Baker merely sets forth the testimony
of the witnesses, then concludes that "clear evidence" showed that Melvin's
evidence was "faked." (See Appellant's Brief p. 14.)
The trial court heard testimony from Jeff Melvin, Appellee's husband,
verifying the expenses incurred, that he himself had paid the expenses, and that
notice was properly sent to Baker as required by statute. In a credibility contest,
the court elected to believe Melvin. The judge's choice to believe one witness
over another is not a basis to overturn a judgment on appeal.
B.

BAKER'S APPEAL REGARDING THE ASSESSMENT OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES IS WAIVED.

Baker's brief did not argue whether the district court erred in awarding
Melvin attorney's fees. Baker has waived this issue on appeal.
C.

THE JUDGMENT IS NOT BARRED BY RES JUDICATA.

In an argument raised for the first time on appeal, Baker argues that Melvin
should have been barred from filing her December 2005 Order to Show Cause
because she had not raised the issue of the arrearages since the previous Order to
Show Cause in December of 1997. Baker's argument fails to identify that Melvin
had any obligation to raise the arrearages before December of 2005 and thus why
Melvin would be barred for not doing so.
4

To the contrary, Melvin brought her claim within the appropriate statute of
limitations. No evidence was presented to suggest that her claim was waived,
equitably or otherwise, except Baker's testimony that he never received notice of
the bills. (The trial court judge elected not to believe Baker on this point.) There
was no obligation that Melvin address the issue at the December 2005 trial, which
was set on the State's Petition to Modify child support.
As Baker did not raise the issue of res judicata below, Baker must establish
that the trial court committed plain error in not concluding Melvin's claims were
barred. Baker cannot do so because there simply is no reason why Melvin's
claims would be barred.
D.

JUDGE SKANCHY WAS UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO
RECUSE HIMSELF.

As neither party filed a motion asking that the trial court judge be
disqualified, Baker argues for the first time on appeal that Judge Skanchy should
have recused himself rather than continue to hear this case following Melvin's
April 2005 letter. Baker cannot establish that the judge was inappropriately
biased, much less that it was plain error for the judge to have failed to recuse
himself.
E.

MELVIN SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES
ON APPEAL.

The lower court found Baker to be in contempt and awarded Melvin
judgment for the medical and daycare arrearages as well as for attorney's fees.

5

Similarly, Melvin should be awarded attorney's fees incurred in the necessity of
defending the judgment on appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I - THE JUDGMENT IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE,
A.

BAKER FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE.

The district court in this case entered written Findings of Fact supporting
the judgment. R. 729-27. The findings include: that Melvin had provided Baker
with verification of expenses (#10, #11, #12, #17, and #19); that Baker was aware
of the debt owed (#15, #16, #17, #20); that Baker had the ability to pay pursuant
to the court order (#22 and #23); and that Baker had willfully refused to pay his
obligation (#21, #22, and #23).
On appeal, Baker argues that these findings were not supported by the
evidence. In order to challenge a factual finding, "[a]n appellant must marshal the
evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the
clear weight of the evidence." In re: Estate of Bartell 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah
1989) (quotations omitted). Unless the evidence is marshaled, this court shall
assume that all findings are adequately supported by the evidence. In re: Estate of
Beeslev, 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994).
This obligation of the appellant is critical. The nature of this duty and its
import were discussed at length by the Supreme Court in Chen v. Stewart. 2004 UT
82, 100 P.3d 1177. The Court cited the Utah Court of Appeals in its explanation that "in
6

order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger must
present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists." Id. at 177
(quoting Neely v. Bennett 2002 UT App 189,1} 11, 51 P.3d 724 (emphasis omitted)).
An appellant may not merely re-argue the factual case at it was presented to the
trial court. Id. (citing Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse Inc., 872 P.2d
1051, 1053 (Utah Ct.App.1994)). Nor may a party merely summarize all of the evidence
that was submitted at trial. Id Rather, the appellant must actually play "devil's
advocate." Id at f 78 (quoting Harding v. Bell, 2002 UT 108,119, 57 P.3d 1093). The
appellant must make the case from the appellee's perspective, construing all facts in
favor of the appellee, and then explain why the trial court's findings are against the clear
weight of the evidence. Id (citations and quotations omitted).
Baker has utterly failed to marshal the evidence in support of the judgment.
Baker's brief reiterates the evidence that was before the trial court, then announces that
there was no evidence to support the conclusion. In particular, Baker appears to take
issue with the court's finding that he was given actual notice of the expenses.
At the evidentiary hearing, copies of the monthly statements sent to Mr. Baker
were admitted as Exhibit 1. T. 5-6. All of the bills and notices that were submitted to
Baker were admitted as Exhibits 2 and 3. T. 11-12. These documents were admitted
based on testimony that the documents were actually sent to Mr. Baker. After
summarizing this evidence, Baker concludes, "It does not appear and there is no record
showing that Mr. Baker was provided the opportunity to validate whether Mr. Baker was
giving notice each month that those payments were being made, even accepting Mr.
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Melvin's testimony that he had mailed monthly statements out to Mr. Baker."
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 13-14 (sic).)
Appellant cannot shift his burden to marshal by claiming that there is no evidence
to support the trial court's findings. "This would inappropriately force an appellee to
marshal the evidence in order to refute an appellant's assertion of the absence of
evidence." Chen, 2004 UT at 179 (citing Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fraden Mfg. Corp.,
2002 UT 94,122, 54 P.3d 1177.) The appellant's failure to marshal the evidence
should result in this Court assuming that the trial court's findings are correct and
affirming the lower court's decision. Chen, 2004 UT at If 80 (citations omitted.)
B.

THE JUDGMENT IS SUPPORTED BY ADEQUATE EVIDENCE.

Baker appears to take issue with three points in particular of the trial court's
findings: (1) that the trial court elected to believe Melvin's testimony and documents
over Baker's testimony, thus denying Baker equitable treatment; (2) that the trial court
concluded Baker had timely notice as required by U.C.A. § 78-45-7.15; and (3) that the
court's judgment did not reflect the evidence but rather represented an effort by the trial
court to placate Mrs. Melvin.
Deference must be given to the trial court's determination of credibility, as it was
the trial court judge who observed the witnesses and their demeanor. Hone v. Hone,
2004 UT App. 241, | 5, 95 P.3d 1221 (citation omitted). Further, "because a trial court
is in an "advantaged position" to consider equities, we give 'considerable deference to
[its] findings and judgment. Id. (quoting Jacobson v. Jacobsoa 557 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah
1976)).
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Mr. Melvin testified that he had sent statements and copies of bills on a monthly
basis. In light of this testimony, the trial court chose not to believe Baker when Baker
testified that he had not received notice of the expenses. This is a credibility judgment
that should not be disturbed on appeal.
Similarly, Baker's argument that no validation was provided and that the claims
were thus time-barred lacks merit. The evidence established that statements and copies
of bills were sent on a monthly basis. Baker's assertion appears to be that he should
have been relieved of his obligations under the Decree of Divorce because, although he
had actual copies of the bills, he did not receive a separate notice that the bills had been
paid. The trial court appropriately found that the written documentation provided to
Baker satisfied the notice requirements of the statute.
Baker's final argument merely reiterates that the trial court's findings were
inconsistent with the evidence. Baker's contention is actually that the trial court's
findings disagreed with his evidence. The court found Melvin's testimony and exhibits
credible and entered judgment accordingly. Baker cannot establish that the trial court
clearly erred in awarding judgment.
POINT II - BAKER HAS WAIVED HIS ARGUMENT REGARDING
ATTORNEY'S FEES.
The second issue identified by Baker in his docketing statement was the propriety
of the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Melvin. As Baker may not raise a new
issue in his reply brief, his failure to argue the issue in his principle brief should be
construed as a waiver of this argument. Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, f 23, 16 P.3d
540.
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POINT III - MELVIN'S JUDGMENT WAS NOT BARRED
BY RES JUDICATA.
For the first time on appeal, Baker argues that Melvin's claims for reimbursement
should have been barred by res judicata.

"As a general rule, appellate courts will not

consider an issue, including a constitutional argument, raised for the first time on appeal
unless the trial court committed plain error or the case involves exceptional
circumstances." State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993). "The trial court is
considered 'the proper forum in which to commence thoughtful and probing analysis' of
issues." Id. at 360 (quoting State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1273 (Utah App. 1990)).
"Failing to argue an issue and present pertinent evidence in that forum denies the trial
court 'the opportunity to make any findings of fact or conclusions of law' pertinent to the
claimed error." Id (quoting LeBaron & Assocs., Inc. v. Rebel Enters., Inc.. 823 P.2d
479, 483 n. 6 (Utah Ct.App.1991)). The choice to raise an issue for the first time on
appeal may well be fatal to the appeal. Marchand v. Marchand 2006 UT App 429,19,
147P.3d538.
To prevail on this issue, Baker must establish that the trial court committed plain
error by showing that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the
trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant." Berkshires, L.L.C., 2005 UT
App. at If 21. Baker fails the first prong of this test in that Baker cannot establish that the
court committed any error on the issue of res judicata.
It is certainly true that res judicata principles apply in divorce proceedings.
Jacobsenv. Jacobsen. 703 P.2d 303, 305 (Utah 1985) (holding "When there has been an
adjudication, it becomes res judicata as to those issues which were either tried and
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determined, or upon all issues which the party had a fair opportunity to present and have
determined in the other proceeding.") However, Baker strains for a unique application of
the rule. Baker's argument may be broken down into two components. First, Baker
suggests that Melvin waived her claims by not addressing them at the trial set for
December 1, 2005. Second, Baker argues that Melvin is barred because she did not raise
the financial issues between 1997 and 2005, although the parties had numerous other
hearings during the interim.
With respect to the first argument, to prevail Baker would first have to
demonstrate that the trial was intended to address the question of arrearages for medical
and daycare. Baker's statement in his brief is, "In this matter, the parties had a trial set
for 'all claims' on December 1, 2005, which included to alleged [sic] determine any
judgments for arrears." (Appellant's Brief p. 23.) Baker cites to R. 439, which are the
minutes of the bench trial. There is no reference to "all claims" in the entry. The clerk's
notes show that the parties reached a partial agreement (on the issue of how to calculate
ongoing child support) and that Melvin's counsel advised the court that an Order to
Show Cause had been filed to specifically address the issue of arrears. It is clear that the
parties and the court contemplated at the trial that the arrearage issue was being reserved.
As there was no pre-trial order or any similar order setting forth what issues were to be
tried, it cannot be said that Melvin's claims are res judicata because they were not
addressed on December 1, 2005.
Turning to the second argument, Baker has cited no authority for his proposition
that Melvin was somehow obligated to bring her Order to Show Cause before she did in
December of 2005. Melvin was free to bring her claim at any time before the statute of
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limitations expired. Baker can cite to no agreement or other behavior on Melvin's part
that could have created an equitable estoppel issue. Baker's sole argument appears to be
that Melvin could have asked for judgment sooner, but chose not to do so.
This is insufficient to bring the doctrine of res judicata to bear, particularly on a
plain error analysis. As Appellant notes in his brief, claim preclusion prevents
relitigation of claims that have actually been litigated or that "could and should have
been litigated" in a prior action. Krambule v. Krambule, 994 P.2d 210, 214 (Utah App.
1999) (citations omitted). The crux here is the "should have" part of the phrase. While
Melvin certainly could have raised her claim earlier, Baker can cite to no authority as to
why she "should have." Baker's claim that res judicata bars this judgment must
therefore fail.
POINT IV - JUDGE SKANCHY HAD NO OBLIGATION TO
RECUSE HIMSELF.
In his second new-on-appeal argument, Baker contends that it was plain error
(and, in fact, a violation of the Due Process Clause) for Judge Skanchy to have remained
on the case after Melvin wrote a letter complaining about him to Governor Huntsman in
April of 2005. There are two flaws to this argument.
The first is the timing of Baker's complaint. Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure specifically provides that a motion to disqualify a judge must be filed
twenty days after assignment of the case to the judge or when the party should have
learned of the grounds on which the motion is based. No one ever filed a motion to
disqualify Judge Skanchy. In fact, after Melvin's letter, there were numerous times when
Judge Skanchy presided over the case with no one's objection. Specifically: an order to
show cause hearing on June 6, 2005 (R. 418-419); the pre-trial conference on November
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3, 2005 (R. 437); the trial on December 1, 2005 (R. 438-439); the initial Order to Show
Cause hearing on these claims on January 23, 2006 (R. 694-695); and the evidentiary
hearing on April 11, 2006 (R. 722-723). If Baker had any reason to think that Judge
Skanchy would be biased one way or the other after Melvin's letter of complaint, it
should have been raised months before now.
The second problem is that where no one did file a motion to disqualify, Baker
must now convince this Court that it was plain error for Judge Skanchy not to notice a
problem and recuse himself. Baker argues that Judge Skanchy's judgment on this issue
was a result of kowtowing to Melvin because he feared another letter rather than a ruling
on the facts. l
Baker can offer nothing but suspicion and conjecture to support his theory, and
more is required to demonstrate that a judge should be removed from a case. Contrary to
Baker's assertions, the mere appearance of a problem is insufficient. " . . . [E]ven
disqualification because of appearance must have some basis in fact and be grounded on
more than mere conjecture and speculation." Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan,
767 P.2d 538, 544 (Utah 1988). When reviewing a motion to disqualify, the court must
initially presume that the judge is qualified. In re: Affidavit of Bias, 947 P.2d 1152, 1153
(Utah 1997) (memorandum decision of Zimmerman, C.J., sitting alone). It is up to the
moving party to overcome that presumption. L±

1

It is interesting to note that at the June 13 Order to Show Cause hearing (R. 408),
Judge Skanchy ordered Melvin to reimburse Baker for any difference in airfare for
the summer visit. One could construe this as a ruling against Melvin, which
contradicts Baker's theory that Judge Skanchy was afraid to rule against her after
her letter of complaing.
13

The only evidence Baker offers of any bias is a reargument of his position that
Judge Skanchy failed to follow the law when the trial court concluded that Baker had
been given valid and appropriate notice of the debts. As argued above, the trial court's
ruling was based on the testimony and documents provided by Mr. Melvin. The trial
court's conclusion did not deny Baker an "equitable opportunity to validate the debts."
The trial court found Mr. Melvin's testimony that he paid the debts was adequate proof to
warrant an order that reimbursement be made.
In sum, the only evidence Baker has is an adverse ruling, which is facially
insignificant in determining whether a judge is biased. Id As neither party objected to
having Judge Skanchy continue on the case for a year after Melvin's letter, it cannot be
said that it was plain error for Judge Skanchy to have failed to recuse himself.
POINT V - MELVIN SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES.
"Generally, when the trial court awards fees in a domestic action to the
party who then substantially prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that
party on appeal." Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah App. 1992).
Melvin was awarded attorney's fees below. Although Baker indicated in the
docketing statement that he was appealing this ruling, it was not argued in his
brief and is therefore waived. Therefore, Melvin should be awarded her
attorney's fees on appeal as well.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's judgment is supported by the record. Melvin offered both
testimony and documentary evidence to verify that expenses had been incurred,
that notification was properly sent to Baker under the statute, and that Baker had
14

refused to pay the expenses. Baker's complaint that the judge should have
believed him, not the Melvins, is not a basis to overturn the judgment on appeal.
Further, Baker cannot establish that it was plain error to deny judgment on
the basis of res judicata. Melvin's claims had not been litigated before, and Baker
cannot show that Melvin had any obligation to present the Order to Show Cause
before it was filed in December of 2005. Baker's argument that the trial judge
should have recused himself is similarly without merit, as Baker has no evidence
that the judge was biased against either party.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judgment should be
AFFIRMED, and Melvin should be awarded attorney's fees and costs on appeal.
DATED this / f

day of March, 2007.

/?%*•—
KEVIN P. SULLIVAN
Attorney for Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that I caused to be served two correct copies of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee via first-class mail, postage prepaid, this /4* day of
March, 2007, to:
D. Bruce Oliver
D. BRUCE OLIVER, L.L.C.
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 -1490
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